In Central Asia, water long ago became an economic and political category. Harvests, tariffs and neighbourhood relations all depend on it.
The map shows the WRI Aqueduct 4.0 water stress score: from 0 (no risk) to 5 (extremely high). The score is how much of the available water is already taken. In some places it's close to zero. In others it's been past four for years.
What follows are five country portraits, from most comfortable to most stressed. Then Kazakhstan separately, where both extremes share one set of borders.
The lowest score in the region - and a pattern of geography, not an achievement. The Amu Darya and Syr Darya begin here: the whole regional water system starts in Tajikistan.
Both rivers run on Pamir glaciers and snowfields. Domestic demand is modest - small population, limited irrigation, almost no heavy industry. The country has enough for itself.
For the neighbours, Tajikistan matters disproportionately. How much water reaches Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and southern Kazakhstan in summer is largely decided here. The Nurek dam and the Rogun project under construction aren't national works - they're regional instruments.
Another headwater country. The Chu, Talas and Naryn all start in the Tien Shan. There's enough water - but the issue isn't volume, it's the schedule.
Snow and ice accumulate in the mountains through winter. Spring melt arrives in the rivers just when fields, hydropower and cities need it.
The vulnerability is timing. If glaciers start melting too early, reservoirs can't catch the peak, and by midsummer water is noticeably short.
Country average: 2.6. Possibly the most misleading number in this whole set.
Some regions are near five. Others below one. The single national figure flattens Caspian semi-desert, irrigated south, northern grain steppe and the foothills of the Zailisky Alatau into one line.
We'll come back to Kazakhstan in detail - the spread is unique in the region. First, two countries whose averages speak for themselves.
The country has almost no rivers of its own - mostly steppe and the Karakum. The whole water economy hangs on one external source and one engineering system.
The source is the Amu Darya, running along the eastern border. The system is the Karakum Canal, built in the second half of the 20th century. It pulls Amu Darya water across the desert all the way to the Caspian. The cotton sector and much of the grain output stand on this water.
The vulnerability is obvious. Anything that happens upstream on the Amu Darya - drought, a new dam, a political decision - shows up in Turkmenistan before anywhere else.
The highest score in the region. And the sharpest seasonal swing.
About 60% of withdrawals go to agriculture - cotton and rice above all. The main irrigated areas are in the lower Syr Darya and Amu Darya: water arrives there after everyone upstream has already taken what they need.
By August the national average reaches 4.3 - well into the «extremely high» band. Those are the months that reveal what didn't arrive from upstream: stress in Uzbekistan reflects the whole basin's balance.
Stress isn't a flat line through the year. It swings with the irrigation season, the spring floods and the peak summer withdrawals.
The chart shows monthly water stress, area-weighted across each country's basins. Uzbekistan reaches 4.3 in August - «extremely high». Its winter low sits around two. The whole annual load on the system lives between those marks.
Hover over any point to see the value for that month.
The country average is 2.6. Behind that number is a spread no average can flatten.
In the west, on the Caspian, the score is above four - withdrawals already formally exceed the available supply. In the north, below one: water risk isn't yet a topic there. Since 2022 the country's 14 oblasts have been joined by three new ones - Abay, Zhetysu and Ulytau - and Shymkent has become a city of republican significance. All are shown separately on the map.
Between those two poles lies a broad middle with scores from two to three. That's where the main changes are unfolding now.
Aqueduct runs three scenarios: optimistic, pessimistic and baseline business-as-usual - things continue as they are, no serious intervention. Under the baseline, by 2050 the internal geography of Kazakhstan's stress shifts noticeably.
The west stays at the ceiling - the score can't rise above five. Zhambyl oblast - a typical south-central case - moves from the «medium-high» band into «high»: from 2.7 to 3.5. That's a qualitative shift.
The most visible change is in the north. In North Kazakhstan the score more than triples, from 0.6 to 1.9. Not a deficit yet. But for the first time, water in the north needs to be taken seriously.
Instead of averaging, look at three oblasts separately. They represent three distinct scenarios: «ceiling», «moving middle» and «entering the risk zone».
Mangystau is already at the ceiling and stays there. Zhambyl climbs steadily into «high». North Kazakhstan, until recently in the comfortable zone, approaches «moderate» by 2050. Hover over the lines for values.
Kazakhstan's stress doesn't have a single cause. The country average of 2.6 covers three different pressure stories, with different geography, infrastructure and economy. We'll start with the most extreme.
The west. Almost no perennial rivers. Population and the oil and gas sector run on Caspian desalination and groundwater aquifers.
In Mangystau the score reaches five. Formally, that means withdrawals already match available supply. By 2050 the picture barely changes - simply because it has nowhere to go.
The south draws from a river whose headwaters are in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The main consumers are rice and cotton. Groundwater levels decline year on year.
Zhambyl oblast is the case to single out. Score today: 2.7. By 2050: 3.5. That's the move from «medium-high» to «high» - the band where the water system starts running under serious strain.
Kazakhstan's wheat region: wheat, barley, rapeseed. Score today: 0.6 to 1.4. Water risk here is currently almost theoretical.
By 2050 the score approaches 2.0. Still not a deficit, but in combination with dry years this is territory worth watching now. Especially given that a large share of Kazakhstan's grain exports comes from here.
Global models like Aqueduct show direction and scale well. For talking about a region or a country as a whole, that's enough.
But the region needs more than country-level conclusions. It needs tools that work at the level of the specific field, the specific intake, the specific canal. Without those, any national plan stays on paper.